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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the global COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of many busi-
nesses, schools, places of worship, and other establishments, Texas federal
and state courts were busy in 2020. They issued significant opinions in
several different areas of insurance law during the Survey period. These
include:
• Three decisions by the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas finding no insurance coverage for COVID-19 business in-
terruption claims because the COVD-19 virus: (1) did not cause di-
rect physical loss or damage as required by the policies; (2) was
excluded from coverage by Virus Exclusions; and (3) was not cov-
ered under a Civil Authority provision in the policy.
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• The first decision by the Texas Supreme Court recognizing an ex-
ception to the well-established rule that extrinsic evidence cannot
be used to determine an insurer’s duty to defend—the collusive
fraud exception.
• A decision from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas holding that Texas public policy precluded an insurer from
indemnifying an insured’s employee for punitive damages awarded
because the employee was driving while intoxicated when he in-
jured another motorist.
• A decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that
an insured does not need to prove an insurer acted wrongfully or in
bad faith to recover under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims
Act.
Despite these decisions, it remains to be seen whether other federal
and state courts will find that COVID-19 business interruption claims are
not covered. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court continues to decline
the opportunity to decide the validity of broader exceptions to the extrin-
sic evidence rule, such as the Northfield exception, despite the inconsis-
tent approach of Texas federal courts and state appellate courts with
respect to such exceptions.1
II. COVID-19
In 2020, the world faced an unprecedented pandemic of the novel,
highly infectious coronavirus, COVID-19. The pandemic generated great
uncertainty in many aspects of modern life, including whether claims for
COVID-19 injuries and damages are covered by insurance. Fortunately,
recent decisions of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas provide some clarity as to coverage for COVID-19 claims. As a
result of orders closing non-essential businesses, lawsuits by insureds
seeking coverage for COVID-19 claims tend to raise four principal issues:
(1) whether COVID-19 losses are “direct, physical loss”; (2) whether a
policy’s “Virus Exclusion” applies to COVID-19; (3) whether a policy’s
“Civil Authority” provision applies to COVID-19 claims; and (4) the re-
quirements for obtaining extra-contractual damages in COVID-19 claims.
These recent COVID-19 decisions emphasize a close review of the pol-
icy language and application of the basic rules of contract interpretation.2
The “paramount rule is that courts enforce unambiguous policies as writ-
ten” such that the district court must “honor plain language, reviewing
policies as drafted, not revising them as desired.”3 The factual back-
1. See Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523, 531 (5th Cir.
2004).
2. See, e.g., Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F. Supp. 3d 353, 358
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2020) (“Insurance policies are contracts and are governed by the prin-
ciples of interpretation applicable to contracts.”).
3. Id. (quoting Pan Am Equities, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 671, 674 (5th
Cir. 2020)).
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grounds of the decisions analyzing COVID-19-related insurance claims
have been relatively similar—the insured’s claim for business interruption
coverage is denied because the insurer believes that COVID-19 and its
consequences are an excluded cause of loss.
A. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT-MANDATED CLOSURE ORDERS
DUE TO COVID-19 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A “DIRECT
PHYSICAL LOSS” UNDER AN INSURANCE POLICY IF
THE LOSS IS MERELY ECONOMIC AS
OPPOSED TO A DISTINCT, DEMONSTRABLE, PHYSICAL ALTERATION OF
THE PROPERTY
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, in Diesel Bar-
bershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, granted the insurer’s motion to dis-
miss after finding that the insured did not sustain a “direct physical loss.”4
The policies’ “Covered Causes of Loss” section stated that State Farm
would “insure for accidental direct physical loss to Covered Property” un-
less the loss is excluded or limited under the policy.5 The district court
held that a loss must be a “distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration of
the property” to constitute direct physical loss.6 Whereas odor and the
release of asbestos are found to constitute a “physical” loss because they
make a business uninhabitable, the same cannot be said for COVID-19.7
COVID-19 is distinguishable because it does not have a physical presence
at the property, nor does it make a business uninhabitable. Rather, the
consequences of the government-mandated closure orders are the cause
of an insured’s damages, not the virus itself. Because the virus merely
causes a detrimental economic impact unaccompanied by a distinct, de-
monstrable, physical alteration of the property, courts find that the in-
sureds failed to plead a direct physical loss as required by the policy for
COVID-19 related damages.8
4. Id. at 362.
5. Id. at 356 (emphasis added); see also Vizza Wash, LP v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 5:20-CV-461-DAE, 2020 WL 6578417, at *6 n.7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2020) (“Covered
Cause of Loss” was defined as a “direct physical loss” unless the loss is otherwise excluded
or limited under the policy.).
6. Diesel Barbershop, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 360; see also Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest v.
Miss. Valley Gas Co., 181 F. App’x 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The requirement that the loss
be ‘physical’ . . . is widely held to exclude alleged losses that are intangible or incorporeal
and, thereby, to preclude any claim against the property insurer when the insured merely
suffers a detrimental economic impact unaccompanied by a distinct, demonstrable, physi-
cal alteration of the property.”).
7. Diesel Barbershop, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 360.
8. Id.; see also Vizza Wash, 2020 WL 6578417, at *6 n.7 (Plaintiff did not allege any
physical alteration or damage to its own property or the adjacent properties, and thus,
plaintiff’s contract claim might also be subject to dismissal on this basis. However, the
court did not decide this issue because the Virus Exclusion barred coverage.).
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B. THE “VIRUS EXCLUSION” IN A POLICY WILL LIKELY BAR
RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS INCOME DUE TO THE
EFFECTS OF COVID-19
Even assuming an insured’s complaint adequately alleges a direct,
physical injury, an insured’s breach of contract claim for COVID-19 re-
lated damages will likely still fail if the policy contains a “Virus Exclu-
sion” that is plainly applicable to the insurance claim.9 In Vizza Wash, LP
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas held that the policy language excluding any “loss or
damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . any virus” unambiguously ex-
cluded the insured’s claimed damages.10 The plaintiff’s allegations were
clear: its business income losses stemmed—at least indirectly—from the
COVID-19 pandemic.11
Similarly, the district court in Diesel Barbershop held that the Virus
Exclusion barred coverage for business interruption losses because the
closure orders were only issued due to the rapid spread of the COVID-19
virus throughout the community.12 The anti-concurrent causation clause
in the Virus Exclusion expressly stated that a loss is excluded regardless
of “whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence within
the excluded event to produce the loss.”13 Therefore, even if the district
court found that there was a direct, physical loss, the Virus Exclusion
applied and barred the insured’s claims because a covered cause of loss
(i.e., physical damage to property) would have combined with an ex-
cluded cause of loss (i.e., a virus capable of causing physical distress, ill-
ness, or disease) and the enforcement of related orders, which would
cause the policies’ ACC clauses to exclude coverage for the insured’s
losses.14
In Independence Barbershop v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co., the Virus
Endorsement contained essentially the same language as in Diesel Bar-
bershop and Vizza Wash.15 However, there was one difference that led to
a different result: the Virus Endorsement contained an additional provi-
sion, Section B.1.f. This provision specifically included coverage for vi-
ruses for up to thirty days for business interruption if “loss or damage to
property caused by . . . virus” leads to suspension of operations and if
“Time Element Coverage applies.”16 The court found that the insured
pled a plausible claim for relief under this section because “[t]he text of
the insurance policy does not limit Section B.1.f. to certain contributing
9. See Vizza Wash, 2020 WL 6578417, at *6.
10. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at *7.
12. Diesel Barbershop, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 361.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 362.
15. Indep. Barbershop, LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. A-20-CV-00555-JRN, 2020
WL 6572428, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2020) (“the virus endorsement” excludes losses
caused by virus “regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in
any sequence to the loss.”).
16. Id. at *4.
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causes.”17 However, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas also held that there was a valid exclusion clause incorporated in the
Virus Endorsement that barred recovery under all other sections of the
policy and thus partially granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss.18 This
decision underscores the importance of closely reviewing Virus Exclu-
sions because they may provide coverage for a limited period of time.
In Diesel Barbershop, even though the insureds alleged that the insurer
denied the insureds’ claims without any investigation and without re-
questing any information or documentation, the district court still held
that plaintiffs’ claims were not covered, or, even if covered, would be
excluded from coverage under the policies, and thus granted the motion
to dismiss.19 In Jada Restaurant Group, LLC v. Acadia Insurance Co., the
insured similarly alleged that the insurer and the adjuster made no re-
quests for documentation or information and quickly denied the claim.20
In reviewing the motion to remand, the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas conducted a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss analysis to
see if plaintiffs pled a reasonable basis to predict that they may recover
against the in-state defendant adjuster.21 The district court found that the
plaintiffs pled a viable claim against the in-state defendant adjuster by
alleging that the adjuster erroneously denied coverage based on the pol-
icy’s virus exclusion, did not conduct a proper investigation, and misrep-
resented the scope of the policy to the plaintiffs.22 Thus, the district court
remanded the case back to state court.23
C. IN ORDER FOR A CIVIL AUTHORITY POLICY PROVISION TO BE
TRIGGERED, THERE MUST BE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO
OTHER PREMISES NEAR THE INSURED’S PROPERTY
Diesel Barbershop is the only Texas federal decision pertaining to
COVID-19 coverage to significantly address the Civil Authority provi-
sion.24 Diesel Barbershop held that the provision was not triggered by
COVID-19.25 The U.S District Court for the Western District of Texas
explained that “civil authority coverage is intended to apply . . . where
access to an insured’s property is prevented or prohibited by an order of
civil authority issued as a direct result of physical damage to other prem-
ises in the proximity of the insured’s property.”26 As previously discussed,
17. Id.
18. Id. The court also denied the insurer’s motion to dismiss the class action claims and
stated it would determine the question of class certification at the appropriate time. Id. at
*5.
19. Diesel Barbershop, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 357–62.
20. Jada Rest. Grp., LLC v. Acadia Ins. Co., No. SA-20-CV-00807-XR, 2020 WL
5362071, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 10, 2020).
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id. at *3–4.
23. Id. at *4.
24. See Diesel Barbershop, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 357.
25. Id. at 362.
26. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Dickie Brennan & Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636
F.3d 683, 686–87 (5th Cir. 2011)).
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the district court found no physical damage and the Virus Exclusion ap-
plied such that the insureds failed to allege a legally cognizable “Covered
Cause of Loss.”27
D. IF THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR A COVID-19 CLAIM, AN
INSURED CAN ONLY RECOVER EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE CLAIM BY
DEMONSTRATING AN INDEPENDENT
INJURY
In Vizza Wash, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions in Republic Insur-
ance Co. v. Stoker and USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, found that
when a policy expressly excludes coverage for COVID-19 related dam-
ages, the denial of the insurance claim may not serve as the basis for
extra-contractual claims unless the plaintiff has alleged an injury indepen-
dent of the policy claim.28 The damages must be “truly independent” and
not “stem” or “flow” from the denial of the insured’s claim.29
In Vizza Wash, the district court held that the insured failed to plausi-
bly allege any independent injury apart from the insurer’s alleged failure
to pay benefits under the policy.30 Nor did the insured attempt to specifi-
cally explain how its extra-contractual claims were independent of its
contract claims.31 Therefore, the district court dismissed the insured’s ex-
tra-contractual statutory and bad faith claims.32 Notably, the district court
also denied leave for the plaintiff to amend its complaint after two previ-
ous amendments because a third amendment would be futile, as the pol-
icy did not provide coverage for loss of business income caused by the
COVID-19 virus.33 Diesel Barbershop also found that the plaintiff’s ex-
tra-contractual claims for breach of the Texas Insurance Code and breach
of the duty and good faith of fair dealing failed where there was no cover-
age provided under the policy.34
27. Id.
28. Vizza Wash, LP v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5:20-CV-00680-OLG, 2020 WL
6578417, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2020) (“For an insured to recover on a bad-faith insur-
ance claim when the insurer has properly denied coverage for the claim, the insured must
demonstrate that the insurer has committed an injury independent of the policy claim.
[citations omitted] Similarly, an insured cannot recover any damages based on an insurer’s
statutory violation unless the insured establishes a right to receive benefits under the policy
or an independent injury caused by the insurer’s conduct.”) (citing Republic Ins. Co. v.
Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995); USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d
479, 500 (Tex. 2018)).
29. Id.




34. Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F. Supp. 3d 353, 362 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 13, 2020).
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III. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
A. WHETHER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING THE DUTY TO DEFEND
In order to determine whether a liability insurer has a duty to defend
its insured against an underlying lawsuit, Texas state and federal courts
apply the “eight-corners rule.”35 Under this well-established rule, the
duty to defend is determined by considering only the claims alleged in the
“four-corners” of the underlying lawsuit’s petition or complaint and the
coverage provided within the “four-corners” of the insurance policy.36
Until 2020, the Texas Supreme Court had never expressly recognized any
exception to the eight-corners rule that would allow consideration of “ex-
trinsic evidence,” i.e., evidence outside of the pleading and the policy.37
However, numerous intermediate Texas appellate and Texas federal
courts employ exceptions to allow extrinsic evidence, particularly where
the evidence pertains to a pure coverage question.38 The courts have
been inconsistent, though, regarding whether to recognize these excep-
tions and how to apply them.39
As discussed in the 2020 SMU Annual Texas Survey, in March 2020,
the Texas Supreme Court in Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, on a certified
question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, refused to
find that the eight-corners rule is inapplicable where the policy does not
include a “groundless-claims clause.”40 The supreme court declined to
broadly address the eight-corners rule and any exceptions and instead
addressed only the narrow certified question.41 The supreme court held
that the “‘policy-language exception’ to the eight-corners rule articulated
by the federal district court . . . is not a permissible exception under Texas
law.”42 The supreme court specifically noted that it was expressing no
opinion on the exception allowing for extrinsic evidence on coverage is-
sues that do not overlap with the merits of the underlying suit, and that it
was reserving comment on whether other policy language or other factual
scenarios may justify the use of extrinsic evidence, as “[t]he varied cir-
cumstances under which such arguments for the consideration of evi-
dence may arise are beyond imagination.”43
35. State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 784 Fed. App’x 247, 250 (5th Cir. 2019).
36. State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 966 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2020).
37. Loya Ins. Co. v. Avalos, 610 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Tex. 2020).
38. See Atain Specialty Ins. Co. v. Galvestonian Condo. Ass’n, No. 3:16-CV-00329,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59784, at *16 n.9 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2020); Richards, 784 Fed. App’x
at 251–52.
39. See Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 597 S.W.3d 492, 496–97 (Tex. 2020); Atain Spe-
cialty Ins., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *16–17 (both citing state appellate cases that differ on
whether to follow the 5th Circuit’s Northfield exception to the eight-corners rule).
40. See J. Price Collins, Janet Tolbert, & Ashley Gilmore, Insurance Law, 6 SMU
ANN. TEX. SURV. 167, 171–72 (2020); Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 493.
41. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 497.
42. Id. at 500.
43. Id.
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In May 2020, just two months after Richards, the Texas Supreme Court,
in Loya Insurance Co. v. Avalos, recognized for the first time an excep-
tion to the eight-corners rule.44 The supreme court held that, in determin-
ing whether an insurer has a duty to defend, a court may consider
extrinsic evidence that an insured and a third party suing the insured col-
luded to make false factual representations in order to secure a defense
and coverage that would otherwise not exist.45
Karla Flores Guevara (Guevara) was insured under an auto policy is-
sued by Loya Insurance Company (Loya).46 The policy explicitly ex-
cluded Guevara’s husband, Rodolfo Flores (Flores), as an excluded
driver.47 While operating Guevara’s automobile, Flores struck an auto-
mobile occupied by Osbaldo Hurtado Avalos and Antonio Hurtado (the
Hurtados).48 Although Flores was the driver at fault, Guevara, Flores,
and the Hurtados reported to the police and Loya that Guevara was driv-
ing the vehicle that collided with the Hurtados.49
The Hurtados sued Guevara, alleging that her negligence caused the
accident.50 Loya appointed defense counsel to defend Guevara.51 During
discovery, Guevara told her attorney that Flores was actually driving the
vehicle at the time of the accident.52 Loya responded by denying cover-
age and withdrawing a defense from Guevara.53 A judgment was ulti-
mately rendered against Guevara.54 The Hurtados, as assignees of
Guevara, then filed suit against Loya and alleged that Loya breached its
duty to defend Guevara.55 Loya counterclaimed for breach of contract,
fraud, and a declaration that it had no duty to defend Guevara because
Flores was an excluded driver.56 Loya moved for summary judgment and
provided as support Guevara’s deposition testimony in the coverage law-
suit against Loya in which Guevara admitted that Flores was driving the
car at the time of the accident.57 The trial court granted Loya’s motion
for summary judgment.58
On appeal to the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals, the Hurtados
contended that summary judgment was improper because the trial court
failed to evaluate Loya’s duty to defend pursuant to the eight-corners
44. See Loya Ins. Co. v. Avalos, 610 S.W.3d. 878, 879 (Tex. 2020).
45. Id. at 884.
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rule.59 The appellate court agreed and reversed the trial court.60
The Texas Supreme Court noted that it had applied the eight-corners
rule numerous times since 1965.61 Although the supreme court had not
recognized any exceptions to the rule, it had indicated twice before that
collusive fraud by the insured might be the basis for an exception.62 The
supreme court observed that there was conclusive, undisputed evidence
that Flores, an excluded driver, and not Guevara, was driving the car.63 It
was also undisputed that the Hurtados agreed with Guevara and Flores to
make false statements regarding who was driving in order to ensure that
there would be coverage and the insurer would have a duty to defend.64
The supreme court found that, in light of the contractual basis for the
eight-corners rule, the rule did not preclude courts from considering such
extrinsic evidence in determining whether there is a duty to defend.65 The
insurer did not agree to, and the insured did not pay for, a duty to defend
the insured against fraudulent allegations that the insured had a role in
creating.66 “Thus, an insurer owes no duty to defend when there is con-
clusive evidence that groundless, false, or fraudulent claims against the
insured have been manipulated by the insured’s own hands in order to
secure a defense and coverage where they would not otherwise exist.”67
Accordingly, the supreme court held that “[i]n determining an insurer’s
duty to defend, a court may consider extrinsic evidence regarding
whether the insured and a third party suing the insured colluded to make
false representations of fact in that suit for the purpose of securing a de-
fense and coverage where they would not otherwise exist.”68 Because the
trial court correctly determined that the extrinsic evidence conclusively
proved collusive fraud, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals
and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the
insurer.69
The Texas Supreme Court’s refusal in Richards to recognize broader
exceptions to the eight-corners rule, despite many Texas appellate courts
and federal courts applying exceptions (such as the Northfield exception),
will continue to create uncertainty in determining whether a duty to de-
fend is owed in the face of extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a claim
is ultimately not covered.70 However, Loya reflects for the first time the
supreme court’s willingness to allow the use of extrinsic evidence to de-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 881.
62. Id.





68. Id. at 884.
69. Id.
70. See generally Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, 363 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.
2004).
2021] Insurance Law 125
termine the duty to defend, albeit under very narrow circumstances. It
remains to be seen whether Loya is an anomaly or a precursor to further,
and perhaps incremental, relaxation of the eight-corners rule by the su-
preme court. Significantly, the supreme court has not rejected the North-
field exception. Therefore, at least in federal courts, parties may still rely
on extrinsic evidence when the elements of Northfield are satisfied.
IV. U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS HOLDS THAT CLAIM AGAINST
MANUFACTURER FOR FAILURE TO
HONOR ROOF WARRANTY
ALLEGED “OCCURRENCE” UNDER ROOF
MANUFACTURER’S COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICIES BUT WAS EXCLUDED UNDER “YOUR WORK” AND
“YOUR PRODUCT” EXCLUSIONS
In Siplast, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas held that a claim brought against
a roof manufacturer for failing to honor its roof warranty alleged an “oc-
currence” under the manufacturer’s Commercial General Liability
(CGL) policies, but the claim was excluded from coverage by the “Your
Work” and “Your Product” exclusions in the policies.71
Siplast, Inc. (Siplast) was a developer and manufacturer of waterproof-
ing and roofing systems.72 The defendant, Employers Mutual Casualty
Company (EMCC), insured Siplast under CGL policies issued annually
from 2012 to 2017 (Policies).73
In October 2018, Cardinal Spellman High School, the Archdiocese of
New York, and the Catholic High School Association (collectively the
Archdiocese) filed a lawsuit against Vema Enterprises (Vema) and Siplast
in New York state court (Underlying Suit).74 According to the Complaint
in the Underlying Suit (Underlying Complaint), in 2011, Vema and the
Archdiocese entered into an agreement under which Vema would pro-
vide and install a new roof at the Cardinal Spellman High School (High
School).75 The roof membrane that Vema installed was manufactured by
Siplast. Siplast provided a Roof/Membrane System Guarantee (Siplast
Guarantee) that warranted that the roof membrane and system (Roof)
would remain watertight for twenty years or Siplast would repair the
Roof at Siplast’s expense.
According to the Underlying Complaint, in November 2016, High
School employees noticed water damage to ceiling tiles throughout the
High School after a rainstorm.76 Siplast referred the Archdiocese to a
71. Siplast, Inc. v. Emps. Mut. Cas. Co., No. 3:19-CV-1320-E, 2020 WL 5747869, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2020).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id.
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designated roofing contractor to fix the leaks and damage. Notwithstand-
ing the contractor’s repair work, there continued to be additional water
leaks and damage at the High School. At a meeting with Archdiocese
officials, Siplast admitted the Roof had problems that required correc-
tion.77 At a subsequent meeting with Vema and the Archdiocese, Vema
advised that any damage or leaks were solely Siplast’s responsibility
under the Siplast Guarantee.78
The Underlying Complaint alleged that, in May 2017, Siplast advised
the Archdiocese that it would hire a contractor to repair the leaks.79
Siplast subsequently told the Archdiocese that Siplast’s earlier attempts
to repair were temporary and that Siplast would not make any permanent
improvements to the Roof under the Siplast Guarantee.80 The Archdio-
cese’s consultant found that there were problems with the materials and
workmanship in the Roof and the Roof had to be replaced.81 The Archdi-
ocese in the Underlying Suit (Underlying Plaintiffs) asserted a breach of
guarantee claim against Siplast.82
EMCC denied defense and indemnity to Siplast for the Underlying
Suit.83 In response, Siplast filed a suit (Coverage Suit) against EMCC for
declaratory relief, breach of contract, and violations of the Texas Insur-
ance Code.84 EMCC filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment
that EMCC was not required to defend or indemnify Siplast from the
Underlying Suit.85
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in the Coverage
Suit.86 In its motion for summary judgment, EMCC contended that
Siplast failed to meet its burden to prove that relief sought by the Under-
lying Plaintiff was for an “occurrence” as the Policies defined that term.87
The Policies defined “occurrence” in relevant part as an “accident.”88
“Accident” is interpreted by Texas courts to mean losses caused by negli-
gence.89 EMCC claimed that the Underlying Lawsuit alleged that Siplast
breached the Siplast Guarantee, but that Siplast’s breach was inten-
tional—not negligent.90 EMCC argued alternatively that the Your Work
and Your Property exclusions, which excluded coverage for “property
damage” to Siplast’s work or product, excluded coverage.91 In its motion






82. Id. at *4.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *1
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id.
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claims were predicated on an occurrence because there were allegations
of damage due to faulty products and work.92 There was no allegation
that Siplast intended or expected damage.93
The district court concluded that the property damage alleged in the
Underlying Suit was caused by defects in the Roof’s workmanship and
materials.94 The Underlying Complaint did not allege that Siplast in-
tended or expected the Roof to fail.95 The Archdiocese’s legal theory for
breach of the Siplast Guarantee was irrelevant.96 Therefore, the court
held that the Underlying Complaint alleged that an accident or “occur-
rence” caused “property damage” alleged by the Archdiocese.97
With respect to the Your Work and Your Property Exclusions in the
Policies, EMCC argued that the Archdiocese only sought the cost to re-
place the Roof, not damages resulting from the Roof.98 Siplast countered
that the Underlying Complaint alleged property damage to the High
School’s interior, such as ceiling tiles that were damaged by water.99 The
district court found that the Archdiocese did not assert any claim for
damage to the High School caused by the Roof other than damage to the
Roof itself.100 The Archdiocese’s sole claim against Siplast was for
Siplast’s refusal to honor the Siplast Guarantee and replace the Roof.101
As a result of refusal, the Archdiocese would be forced to spend approxi-
mately $5 million to replace the Roof.102 The Your Work Exclusion ex-
cluded coverage for the cost to repair Siplast’s work.103 Accordingly,
because the Archdiocese was seeking damages from Siplast that were ex-
cluded by the Your Work and Your Product Exclusions, the Court found
that EMCC had no duty to defend Siplast.104 Because EMCC had no
duty to defend Siplast, EMCC thus had no duty to indemnify Siplast from
the Underlying Suit.105
Siplast underscores the need for insurers and their counsel to closely
examine the allegations of the underlying lawsuit before making a deter-
mination as to the insurer’s defense and indemnity obligations. Like the
policies in Siplast, many modern CGL policies state that “[t]his insurance
applies . . . only if: [t]he ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ is caused by
an ‘occurrence.’”106 These policies do not explicitly state that an insured’s
conduct must be an “accident” or “occurrence.” Thus, when a petition or
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id.
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complaint alleges that an insured has committed intentional conduct, in-
surers and their counsel must carefully consider whether the insured’s
intentional conduct is alleged to be the true cause of the property damage
before denying defense and indemnity based on no occurrence. Addition-
ally, the mere allegation in the petition or complaint of property damage
to property other than the insured’s work or product does not mean the
Your Work and Your Product exclusions are inapplicable. If the plaintiff
is not seeking damages from the insured for property damage to property
other than the insured’s work or product, the Your Work and Your Prod-
uct exclusions may still apply, precluding the insurer from having a duty
to defend and indemnify.
V. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
HOLDS THAT “PROPERTY DAMAGE” OCCURED
WHEN CONTRACTOR DAMAGED
ELECTRICAL WIRING, NOT WHEN
HOME WAS LATER DAMAGED BY FIRE
In Gonzalez v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that, under a CGL policy, where a fire damaged
a home after the policy period—but the fire was allegedly caused by a
contractor who damaged the home’s electrical wiring during the policy
period—the “property damage” occurred during the policy period.107
In the summer of 2013, Gilbert Gonzalez (Gonzalez) was hired by Nor-
man Hamilton (Hamilton) to install new siding on Hamilton’s home.108
Mid-Continent Casualty Company (Mid-Continent) issued a CGL policy
to Gonzalez, which was in effect from July 2012 to June 2013 and re-
newed until June of 2014 (collectively, the Policy).109 A fire damaged
Hamilton’s home in December 2016.110 Hamilton and his insurer filed
suit in Texas state court against Gonzalez (Underlying Suit), alleging that
Gonzalez caused the fire by negligently hammering nails through the
electrical wiring in the home during installation of the siding.111
Mid-Continent refused to defend or indemnify Gonzalez, so Gonzalez
sued Mid-Continent in Texas state court (Coverage Suit).112 After remov-
ing the Coverage Suit to federal court, Mid-Continent filed a motion for
summary judgment.113 Mid-Continent’s motion was denied and the fed-
eral court entered partial final judgment in favor of Gonzalez, holding
that Mid-Continent had a duty to defend him.
Gonzalez’s Policy stated in relevant part that “[t]his insurance applies
to . . . ‘property damage’ only if . . . [the] ‘property damage’ is caused by
an ‘occurrence’ . . . [and the] ‘property damage’ occurs during the policy
107. Gonzalez v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 969 F.3d 554, 554 (5th Cir. 2020).
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period.”114 The term “occurrence” was defined in relevant part as “an
accident,” and “property damage” was defined in relevant part as
“[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use
of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time
of the physical injury that caused it.”115
The Fifth Circuit found the petition in the Underlying Suit alleged an
accident, and thus an “occurrence,” and also alleged “property dam-
age.”116 The court then considered whether the property damage oc-
curred during the policy period.117 It was undisputed that all of
Gonzalez’s actions, including his hammering of the nails, took place dur-
ing the policy period. Thus, the damage to the home’s electrical wiring
occurred during the policy period. Moreover, the Underlying Petition al-
leged that the fire at the Home in 2016 related back to Gonzalez’s 2013
siding installation.118 Thus, the fire damage in 2016 was deemed to occur
when Gonzalez damaged the electrical wires in 2013.119 Because the re-
quirements of “occurrence,” “property damage,” and “property damage”
that occurs during the policy period were met, the Fifth Circuit found that
Mid-Continent had a duty to defend.120
Mid-Continent also asserted that the Damage to Property Exclusions
in the Policy, (j)(5) and (j)(6), excluded coverage.121 However, the Fifth
Circuit noted that these exclusions only pertained to the particular part of
the property on which the insured’s work was performed.122 Because
Gonzalez was not hired to perform, and did not perform, work on the
electrical wiring, exclusions (j)(5) and (j)(6) were inapplicable.123 Accord-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s partial final judgment
in Gonzalez’s favor on the duty to defend.124
It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit did not find that it was the
date of the accident (i.e., “occurrence”) that triggers coverage under the
Policy. Rather, the court found that, in this particular instance, property
damage occurred simultaneously with the insured’s accidental conduct
because the insured’s conduct instantly damaged the wiring.125 Because
this property damage occurred during the policy period, coverage was
triggered.126
114. Id.
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VI. U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS HOLDS THAT, UNDER TEXAS PUBLIC
POLICY, INSURER HAS NO OBLIGATION
TO INDEMNIFY INSURED’S
EMPLOYEE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
EMPLOYEE’S GROSS NEGLIGENCE
In Frederking v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, held that Texas pub-
lic policy barred an insurer from having an obligation to indemnify an
employee of its insured for punitive damages awarded because of the em-
ployee’s gross negligence in causing an automobile accident while
intoxicated.127
Richard Frederking (Frederking) sustained serious personal injuries af-
ter a vehicle driven by Carlos Sanchez (Sanchez) collided with Frederk-
ing’s vehicle (Accident).128 Sanchez pled guilty to driving while
intoxicated (DWI) and admitted he caused the Accident.129 Sanchez was
operating a vehicle owned by his employer, Advantage Plumbing Ser-
vices (Advantage), at the time of the Accident. Advantage had assigned
the vehicle to Sanchez for work. Despite the suspension of his driver’s
license, Sanchez told Advantage that he had a valid license. Sanchez had
four prior DWI convictions.130 Cincinnati had issued an insurance policy
to Advantage (Policy).131
Frederking sued Sanchez and Advantage in Texas state court (Underly-
ing Suit), asserting claims of negligence and gross negligence against
Sanchez, and negligent entrustment and respondeat superior against Ad-
vantage.132 In the Underlying Suit, Cincinnati defended Sanchez and Ad-
vantage.133 Sanchez was found negligent and grossly negligent by the
jury. Advantage was found liable for negligent entrustment. The jury
awarded compensatory damages to Frederking against Sanchez and Ad-
vantage. The jury awarded $207,550.00 to Frederking for punitive dam-
ages against Sanchez.134 Cincinnati satisfied the compensatory damages
award but refused to pay the punitive damages award. Frederking then
sued Cincinnati in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, San Antonio Division, as a third-party beneficiary to the Policy.135
Frederking sued Cincinnati for breach of contract and a declaration that
Cincinnati had to pay the award of punitive damages.
Cincinnati moved for summary judgment, in part, on the ground that
Texas public policy barred an obligation by Cincinnati to indemnify
127. Frederking v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (W.D. Tex. 2020).
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Sanchez for the punitive damages award.136 According to Cincinnati,
Texas public policy made Sanchez solely responsible for the punitive bur-
dens of his gross negligence.137 Thus, the punitive damages were not in-
surable under the Policy.138 Frederking responded that excusing
Cincinnati from its contractual obligations that were freely negotiated
would violate Texas public policy.139
In Fairfield Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., the Texas Supreme
Court previously provided guidance on insurability of punitive dam-
ages.140 Fairfield established a two-step test to determine whether puni-
tive damages were insurable: (1) determine whether the policy’s plain
language covers punitive damages, and (2) if so, decide whether Texas
public policy permits coverage under the circumstances of the underlying
lawsuit.141 Absent legislative decision, the interests in enforcing an agree-
ment must be weighed against the public policy interest in not enforcing
the agreement.142 In assessing the public policy interest, the courts should
consider the purpose of punitive damages to punish the wrongdoer and
deter such conduct by others.143
The district court in Frederking observed that the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Minter v. Great American Insur-
ance Co.144 addressed whether Texas public policy precluded an
employer’s insurance policy from covering punitive damages awarded for
the gross negligence of an employee whose intoxicated driving caused
injury.145 While Minter is an unpublished opinion and not binding on the
district court, it is instructive and persuasive in how to apply Fairfield to
the facts of this case.146 As in Minter, Sanchez pled guilty to DWI in con-
nection with the Accident, admitted he was responsible for causing inju-
ries, and was a repeat DWI offender.147 The jury found the punitive
damages were justified solely against Sanchez, not Advantage, because of
Sanchez’s extreme and avoidable conduct.148 Allowing Advantage’s Pol-
icy to cover the punitive damages would not further the punitive or deter-
rent purposes of punitive damages under Texas law because the burden
would fall entirely on the insurer and the insured, not the tortfeasor.149 It
would frustrate the significant public policy of deterring and punishing
136. Id. at 579.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 579–80.
140. See generally Fairfield Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., 246 S.W.3d 653 (Tex.
2008).
141. Frederking, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 580 (citing Fairfield, 246 S.W.3d. at 655).
142. Id. at 581.
143. Id.
144. 394 F. App’x 47, 50 (5th Cir. 2010).
145. Frederking, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 582.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 582–83.
148. Id. at 583.
149. Id.
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drivers who choose to drive while intoxicated and injure others.150 More-
over, Advantage, not Sanchez, negotiated the policy and paid the premi-
ums.151 To punish and deter Sanchez’s grossly negligent conduct,
Sanchez, not Cincinnati, must be held responsible for the punitive
damages.152
Therefore, the district court held that Texas public policy prohibited
Cincinnati from having to indemnify Sanchez for the punitive damages
awarded because of Sanchez’s gross negligence.153 Accordingly, the dis-
trict court granted Cincinnati’s motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed Frederking’s claims with prejudice.154
Frederking represents a significant application of the Fairfield test for
determining the insurability of punitive damages where there is gross
negligence. However, it remains to be seen whether Texas courts will rely
on Frederking to find that punitive damages in gross negligence cases not
involving intoxicated driving are not insurable. Arguably, any punitive
damages awarded for grossly negligent or reckless conduct for which
there is a strong public interest to punish and deter should not be
insurable.
VII. U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS DISMISSES INSURED’S BREACH OF
CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURER BECAUSE NO LIABILITY JUDGMENT WAS
OBTAINED, BUT PERMITS INSURED TO PROCEED WITH
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURER
In Ibarra v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed an insured’s claim
against his underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer for breach of contract
for the insurer’s failure to pay UIM benefits, because the insured had not
obtained a judgment that the responsible driver was liable and that the
insured was entitled to damages.155 However, the district court allowed
the insured to proceed to litigate the tortfeasor’s liability and damages
through a declaratory judgment action against the insurer.156
Ibarra filed suit in the district court against his UIM Insurer, Allstate
Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate).157 Ibarra alleged that
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ous bodily injury to Ibarra during an automobile accident. However, All-
state rejected Ibarra’s UIM claim. After Allstate filed a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss all of Ibarra’s claims, Ibarra filed an amended complaint. The
amended complaint set forth a breach of contract claim for Allstate’s al-
leged failure to pay UIM benefits and, alternatively, sought a declaratory
judgment under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act as to the amount
of UIM benefits Ibarra was entitled to obtain.158
Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Brainard v. Trinity
Universal Insurance Co.,159 Allstate argued that it was not contractually
obligated to pay Ibarra UIM benefits until Ibarra obtained a judgment
establishing Saucedo’s underinsured status and liability.160 Because there
was no such judgment, Ibarra’s breach of contract claim had to be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim.161 However, Allstate acknowledged
that Ibarra’s alternative demand for relief under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment act was proper.162 Ibarra argued that the Sixth Texarkana
Court of Appeal’s decision in In re Koehn163 permitted Ibarra to pursue a
breach of contract claim.164
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas found that,
under Brainard, the UIM insurer had no contractual obligation to pay
UIM benefits until the insured obtained a judgment establishing the al-
leged tortfeasor’s underinsured status and liability.165 This judgment
could be obtained against the tortfeasor in a coverage suit against the
UIM insurer.166 However, under established case law from the Texas fed-
eral district courts, if Ibarra opted to proceed directly against Allstate, he
could obtain a judgment as to the tortfeasor’s liability and Ibarra’s dam-
ages through a declaratory judgment action, but could not obtain a judg-
ment on a breach of contract claim.167 Until Ibarra obtained a judgment
establishing Saucedo’s liability and that Ibarra was entitled to damages,
and Allstate denied payment of UIM benefits after such judgment was
rendered, Allstate did not breach the UIM insurance contract.168
Therefore, the district court held Ibarra’s breach of contract claim
against Allstate for failure to pay UIM benefits was premature and not
ripe for adjudication.169 The district court thus had no subject matter ju-
risdiction over the unripe breach of contract claim.170 Accordingly, the
district court dismissed the breach of contract claim without prejudice for
158. Id.
159. 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2006).
160. Ibarra, 2020 WL 3259806, at *1.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 86 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
164. Ibarra, 2020 WL 3259806, at *2.
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction.171 However, the district court held that
Ibarra’s suit against Allstate would proceed as to the request for declara-
tory relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.172 Thus, while
an insured may not successfully recover against an insurer on contractual
and extra-contractual claims until there is a judgement establishing that
the insured is entitled to recover damages from the UIM, the district
court determined that the insured may establish its entitlement to dam-
ages from the UIM in a declaratory judgment action against the insured.
If, after receiving such a declaratory judgment, the insurer refuses to pay
UIM benefits owed, the insured may proceed at that time with breach of
contract and extra-contractual claims.
VIII. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES
A. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT
RECOVERY UNDER THE TEXAS PROMPT PAYMENT OF
CLAIMS ACT ONLY REQUIRES LIABILITY UNDER
THE POLICY AND FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE ACT’S DEADLINES
In Agredano v. State Farm Lloyds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that insureds: (1) could recover 18% interest and attor-
ney’s fees under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA) even
without specifically citing to the TPPCA or its language, and (2) insureds
did not need to prove the insurer acted wrongfully or in bad faith to re-
cover under the TPPCA, but only needed to prove liability under the
policy and violation of the TPPCA’s deadlines.173
State Farm Lloyds (State Farm), the homeowners’ insurer of Jesus and
Margaret Agredano (Agredanos), denied the Agredanos’ claim for wind-
storm damage to their home.174 The Agredanos sued State Farm for
breach of contract and extra-contractual causes of action.175 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on all claims
except for the Agredanos’ claim for breach of contract.176 Ultimately, the
district court held that the failure of the Agredanos to specifically plead
relief under the TPPCA precluded their recovery of the requested 18%
statutory interest and attorney’s fees and entered judgment only for the
breach of contract damages found by the jury, along with the regular pre-
judgment and post-judgment interest.177 The Agredanos appealed.178
On appeal, State Farm argued that because the Agredanos did not cite
the TPPCA or quote the statute’s language, they did not plead a claim for
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Agredano v. State Farm Lloyds, 975 F.3d 504, 504–07 (5th Cir. 2020).
174. Id. at 504–05.
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TPPCA interest.179 The Fifth Circuit observed that the Agredanos pled
that they were entitled to an “18% [p]enalty [i]nterest pursuant to Ch.
542 of the Texas Insurance Code” and “[a]ttorney’s fees.”180 While the
pleading could have been more explicit, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” standard does not generally require magic
words or detailed facts.181 The court determined that the statutory inter-
est claim was not improperly pled because the claim was not specula-
tive.182 Further, State Farm was clearly aware of the Agredanos’ claims
because it did not file a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement
arguing that it did not understand the pleadings, the TPPCA was noted in
the Agredanos’ discovery responses, and State Farm argued in its own
summary judgment motion that the Agredanos asserted causes of action
based on Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.183
The Fifth Circuit then considered the question addressed in its prior
unpublished and non-precedential opinion, Chavez v. State Farm
Lloyds:184 whether violation of the bad faith provisions of the Texas In-
surance Code is a prerequisite to recovery under the TPPCA.185 While
the Chavez court held that, upon dismissal of bad faith insurance code
claims, recovery under § 542.060 of the Texas Insurance Code becomes
impossible, the Fifth Circuit stated that this holding was contrary to sub-
sequent Texas Supreme Court cases and was no longer good law.186 In
Barbara Technologies Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, the Texas Supreme
Court held that “[n]othing in the TPPCA would excuse an insurer from
liability for TPPCA damages if it was liable under the terms of the policy
but delayed payment beyond the applicable statutory deadline.”187 The
supreme court found that “[t]o prevail under a claim for TPPCA damages
under § 542.060, the insured must establish: (1) the insurer’s liability
under the insurance policy, and (2) that the insurer has failed to comply
with one or more sections of the TPPCA in processing or paying the
claim.”188
The Fifth Circuit observed that the Texas Supreme Court treats the
TPPCA as a strict liability provision.189 Thus, a plaintiff does not need to
prove that the insurer acted wrongfully or in bad faith.190 Rather, the
statute only requires two things: (1) liability under the policy, and (2) a
179. Id.
180. Id. at 506.
181. Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
182. Agredano, 975 F.3d at 506.
183. Id.
184. 746 F. App’x 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2018).
185. Agredano, 975 F.3d at 506.
186. Id. at 507.
187. Id. (quoting Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex.
2019)).
188. Id. (quoting Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d at 813).
189. Id.
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failure to comply with the timing requirements set forth in the TPPCA.191
Because the Agredanos were successful on their breach of contract claim,
and the district court erred in holding that Chavez barred the Agredanos’
claims for 18% penalty interest and attorney’s fees under the TPPCA, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.192
IX. APPRAISAL
A. THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS VOIDS AN APPRAISAL AWARD AND STRIKES THE
APPOINTED UMPIRE BECAUSE OF THE INSURED’S
FAILURE TO SATISFY THE SWORN
PROOF OF LOSS CONDITION PRECEDENT
In GuideOne Mutual Insurance Co. v. First Baptist Church of Brown-
field, First Baptist Church of Brownfield (First Baptist) submitted a claim
for hailstorm damage to its property.193 After its investigation, First Bap-
tist’s insurer, GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company (GuideOne) paid
the insured $38,000.00.194 Disputing the value of the loss, the insured in-
voked the appraisal clause in the policy issued by GuideOne (Policy).
GuideOne informed First Baptist that this was premature, and GuideOne
made its first request for a sworn proof of loss. First Baptist requested
that a state court appoint an umpire. After the court appointed an um-
pire, GuideOne hired its own appraiser. First Baptist never sent Guide-
One a sworn proof of loss. The appraisers’ evaluations were over $1
million apart; the umpire then issued an award of $918,085.38.195 The um-
pire and First Baptist’s appraiser signed the award, but GuideOne’s ap-
praiser did not.196
GuideOne moved for summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment: (1) finding
the appraisal award was not made in substantial compliance with the pol-
icy and/or was not made with proper authority; (2) striking the appointed
umpire; and (3) setting aside the appraisal award as void.197 The district
court ultimately granted the motion for summary judgment because the
appraisal award was made without authority and not in substantial com-
pliance with the Policy, and GuideOne did not waive any condition
precedent.198
Texas courts often recognize three situations where a binding appraisal
may be disregarded: “(1) when the award was made without authority;
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Baptist Church of Brownfield, No. 5:19-CV-086-
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(2) when the award was the result of fraud, accident, or mistake; or (3)
when the award was not made in substantial compliance with the terms of
the contract.”199 The first and third situation existed in GuideOne, and
the court analyzed these two issues.200
The district court found that the first situation existed because First
Baptist did not properly invoke the appraisal process by filing a sworn
proof of loss, which was a condition precedent under the insurance con-
tract.201 A condition precedent is generally defined as “an event that
must happen or be performed before a right can accrue to enforce an
obligation.”202 Under the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Paj, Inc. v.
Hanover Insurance Co., an “insured’s failure to timely notify its insurer of
a claim or suit does not defeat coverage if the insurer was not prejudiced
by the delay.”203 The so-called notice-prejudice rule has been interpreted
differently by Texas appellate and federal district courts, and the district
court analyzed whether it applied to the case at bar.204 The district court
reconciled the competing holdings and found they supported a finding
that a sworn proof of loss is a condition precedent to invoking apprais-
als.205 Although the Policy’s language requiring a sworn proof of loss was
not included in the appraisal clause, the district court read all of the parts
of the Policy together to find that, taken as a whole, it is clear the proof of
loss was a condition precedent.206 The district court reasoned that Paj’s
notice-prejudice rule applies when the sworn proof of loss’s purpose is
merely to serve as a notice of disagreement, but not when, as in the pre-
sent case, the sworn proof of loss was intended to quantify the parties’
disagreement.207
Moreover, the district court found that the notice-prejudice rule was
intended to avoid complete forfeiture of coverage as the result of an in-
sured’s failure to provide timely notice of the loss to the insurer.208 Here,
there was no potential forfeiture of coverage and GuideOne never chal-
lenged First Baptist’s coverage.209 Instead, GuideOne sought compliance
with their agreement even after the loss was paid.210 Consequently, the
district court held that GuideOne did not need to demonstrate prejudice
from First Baptist’s failure to provide a sworn proof of loss under the
Policy.211
Next, the district court found that the appraisal award was not made in
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Solar Applications Eng’g v. T.A. Operating Corp., 327 S.W.3d 104,
108 (Tex. 2010)).
203. Id. (quoting Paj, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636–37 (Tex. 2008)).
204. Id. at *4–8.
205. Id. at *6–7.
206. Id. at *6.
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substantial compliance with the Policy’s terms.212 First Baptist argued it
satisfied the proof of loss provision by providing the same information
through its appraisal; however, it failed to identify when that information
was provided or argue whether it was timely.213 While a proof of loss only
requires substantial compliance, to be effective, it must occur within the
time period allowed for furnishing the formal proof of loss.214 The district
court found that the request for a sworn proof of loss was made on Febru-
ary 21, 2018, and the appraisal was not compiled until June 28, 2018—127
days after the first request.215 At a minimum, even if the appraisal con-
tained the right information, it was sixty-seven days late, and the district
court found that First Baptist did not substantially comply with the proof
of loss provision.216
Moreover, the district court found that First Baptist did not properly
invoke the appraisal process because it sought appointment of an umpire
prior to submitting a proof of loss.217 Reading the Policy as a whole, the
district court found that the proof of loss was necessary in the event of a
loss, regardless of whether the parties sought to invoke appraisal because
it provided substantive information that would allow the parties to deter-
mine whether appraisal was appropriate.218 Therefore, without satisfying
this condition precedent, First Baptist could not invoke the appraisal pro-
cess under the terms of the agreement.219 Because First Baptist did not
comply with the proof of loss provision or generally cooperate with
GuideOne, who did not hide the provision, the appointment of the um-
pire and the subsequent award were premature.220
Because “[t]he failure to perform a condition precedent may be waived
by the failure to insist on performance,” the court then analyzed whether
GuideOne waived the requirement of a sworn proof of loss.221 While a
policy’s non-waiver clause is binding and enforceable and may be “some
evidence of non-waiver,” it is not a complete bar to finding that a particu-
lar provision was indeed waived.222 Here, the Policy at issue contained a
non-waiver clause, which, under Texas law, created the presumption that
GuideOne did not intend to relinquish its rights.223 First Baptist at-
tempted to argue that GuideOne waived any condition precedent to the
212. Id. While normally this is an issue for the trier of fact because all material facts
were undisputed, the court was able to determine that First Baptist did not substantially
satisfy the proof of loss provision through substantial compliance. Id.
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appraisal clause by selecting its appraiser and participating in the ap-
praisal process.224 However, the district court rejected this argument,
finding that First Baptist’s brief failed to raise any legal arguments on the
issue of waiver and thus failed to overcome the presumption created by
the non-waiver provision.225 In addition, the district court noted that
GuideOne insisted that a sworn proof of loss be provided on four sepa-
rate occasions, suggesting that this would be enough to show that waiver
did not occur.226
Thus, because the condition precedent was not fulfilled and GuideOne
did not waive compliance, the district court held that the appraisal award
was not entered with the appropriate authority and was not in substantial
compliance with the Policy’s terms.227 Therefore, GuideOne was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on its declaratory judgment action.228 Ac-
cordingly, the district court granted GuideOne’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, declared that the appraisal award was void, and struck the ap-
pointed umpire.229
Under GuideOne, where the insured has not submitted a proof of loss,
an insurer would appear to have the option to prevent the appraisal from
proceeding, or as happened in GuideOne, allow the appraisal to go for-
ward and subsequently challenge an unfavorable appraisal award. How-
ever, one reason for the district court’s decision was that GuideOne
asked the insured four times to provide a proof of loss and the insured
did not cooperate. Thus, insurers would be well-advised to make repeated
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